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ideas are explored using a formal simulation model employing the framework of NK 
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The past 40 years has seen the emergence of significant interest in examining the 
population dynamics of organizations from an evolutionary perspective (Campbell, 1965; 
Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982). A defining feature of the evolutionary 
perspective is that selection disproportionately removes organizations that are less fit. Yet there 
is reason to believe that this selection process may not be effective in eliminating organizations 
undergoing change. First, selection does not operate directly on relatively stable organizational 
traits, such as strategies or routines that are fundamental to firm-level heterogeneity. Instead, 
selection operates on the manifestations of those traits in terms of observable performance 
outcomes such as productivity, patents, new products, product quality and cost, market share, 
sales, or profits. Moreover, even stable organizational traits, including an organization’s search 
strategy, may lead to performance manifestations that are highly variable. To the extent that 
organizations’ stable traits lead to differences in the nature of learning, they may give rise to 
significant differences in the reliability of performance over time. Consequently, organizational 
populations may experience different survival patterns in the selection process not merely based 
on some inherent superiority of one form or another but also as influenced by the dynamics of 
change that different forms generate over time. 
Second, while change processes and their effects on performance play out over time, 
selection processes are fundamentally myopic in that they cannot “see” those future effects. 
Selection is the outcome of a complex web of atomistic and, to some degree, also inherently 
myopic decisions about the distribution of resources across firms. The quintessential example of 
myopia is that of individual purchase decisions in product markets, where products’ 
characteristics, such as quality and price, drive consumers’ choice and hence selection outcomes 
for the product. Even forward-looking actors in capital markets are myopic decision makers in 
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that they must construct expectations of future performance solely based on such indicators of 
past and current performance as sales, profits, or patent filings. One important consequence of 
the myopia of selection is that even if selection is effective in removing inferior organizations at 
one point in time, it may be ineffective over time in that it may remove organizations that, had 
they survived, would have gone on to do well. 
The question is whether there are conditions under which myopic selection can identify 
adapting organizations at intermediate points in time, while they are still in the midst of change, 
that will be superior in the long-run. The existing literature provides some important rationales as 
to why selection processes may fail in this respect, indicating why inferior organizations, 
populations, or technologies may dominate the set of survivors (Barron, West, and Hannan, 
1994; Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Barnett and Burgelman, 1996; Barnett, 1997). Three broad 
classes of answers have been proposed. First, selection does not act on a single dimension of 
performance but, in fact, on a multitude of potential performance criteria. Thus the outcome of 
the selection process can be as much a function of political and social competition as it is 
technical competition on the merits of alternatives (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Second, 
organizational slack acts as a buffer to stave off failure even when organizations are weak from a 
technical efficiency standpoint (Levinthal, 1991b; Barnett, Greve, and Park, 1994; Barron, West, 
and Hannan, 1994). Third, path dependence can arise from network externalities (David, 1985; 
Arthur, 1989) where relative market shares of alternative forms or technology influence selection 
forces, and as such, outcomes at a given point in time are in part a function of prior choices and 
outcomes (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Carroll and Harrison, 1994; Barnett and Burgelman, 
1996; Barnett, 1997).  
A different reason, however, is that selection may be systematically prone to errors, 
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which is suggested by the results of Carroll and Harrison’s (1994) examination of the extent to 
which selection processes are historically efficient. Building on March and Olsen (1989), Carroll 
and Harrison (1994: 720) framed the issue as the extent to which “organizational arrangements 
observed at a particular point in time represent the unique outcome of some systematic process 
such as competition.” Focusing on differential selection among types of organizations, they 
employed a computational model of the evolution of two populations of fully inert organizations 
under an ecological selection regime based on legitimation and competition. They concluded that 
deviations from historical efficiency may arise from differences in organizations’ order of entry 
into a population due to the positive feedback effects of legitimation. As a result, it is possible 
for a population of inferior organizations to come to dominate the set of surviving firms if they 
enter first. 
Carroll and Harrison (1994) focused on entry order in their model. Alternatively, as 
developed here, one can start with the assumption that organizations are engaged in a learning 
process and thus exhibit performance manifestations that vary over time. The unfolding of an 
organization’s particular history is then a function of both its idiosyncratic founding conditions 
and the strategies that guide its learning. Strategies that lead to higher variance in performance 
over time are likely to increase the extent to which selection is prone to err in selecting out 
organizations that would have gone on to achieve a high level of performance. In turn, selection 
errors, in which inferior firms survive selection, would decrease the average performance of the 
set of surviving firms. When organizations within a population are distinguished by strategies 
that differ in reliability and performance, an important element of selection consists of sorting 
among organizations in a single population. Under these conditions, differences across 
populations in reliability over time alone are sufficient to generate outcomes in which the 
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population with inferior mean long-run performance, but higher reliability, dominates the set of 
surviving firms. 
In the model developed in this paper, we highlight the central role of reliability in 
performance. However, in contrast to ecological models in which selection favors reliability 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1977; 1984), our model imposes no a priori relationship between 
reliability and mortality. Rather, the role of reliability emerges endogenously from a model in 
which firms that are subject to selection employ strategies that are inert, but these fixed search 
strategies guide organizational learning. 
Important stable attributes of organizations such as search strategies, or routines may 
differ in their contribution not only to organizational performance at a given point in time but 
also to the variance across time. In turn, these stable traits differentially affect the extent to which 
selection is prone to errors. We denote this effect on the efficacy of selection as “selectability” 
which is an organization-level construct that measures the information content embodied in 
current performance as a critical determinant of the efficacy of selection in identifying 
organizations that will be superior in the long run. For organizations that exhibit high levels of 
selectability, intermediate performance manifestations will provide superior information about 
their long-run performance, and consequently, selection in populations of such organizations will 
be more effective over time. Thus, even when a set of search strategies across organizations 
share common long-run properties, the dynamics by which organizations reach this long-run 
performance level have important implications for the selectability among organizational 
populations and the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level adaptation. 
Questions about the nature of organizational change and its consequences for the efficacy 
of selection, though relatively unexplored, are not new. Campbell (1960, 1965), in laying the 
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foundation of evolutionary perspectives in the social sciences, suggested one important factor 
driving the efficacy of selection. He argued that “if discovery or expansions of knowledge are [to 
be] achieved, blind variation is requisite”; blind implies that “specific correct trials are no more 
likely to occur…than specific incorrect trials” (Campbell, 1982: 86). Nevertheless, the 
organizational analogue differs from its biological foundations in a critical way: organizations 
engage in adaptive trial-and-error search strategies that are intended to enhance their survival 
prospects (Simon, 1955; Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982). Simon (1969: 95), 
in contrast to Campbell, argued that such “trial and error is not completely random or blind.” 
This classic debate highlights a central but unresolved question related to the efficacy of 
selection as a mechanism of population-level adaptation: Is the efficacy of selection invariant to 
the characteristics of the processes (e.g., blind vs. non-blind variation) that guide organizational 
change? 
To gain insight into the effect of differential reliability on the efficacy of selection, we 
implemented a formal agent-based model using an NK methodology (Kauffman, 1993; 
Levinthal, 1997; Rivkin, 2000). This formal structure offers a number of critical advantages over 
other forms of theorizing. First, our theory involves the intersection of three central features of 
learning models: partially stochastic outcomes, path dependence, and interdependence among the 
adapting entities. Under these conditions, verbal theorizing is inadequate for the complexity of 
theorizing, and closed-form analytical models are nearly impossible to implement (Lane, 1993). 
Second, our theory is multilevel in that it involves adaptation at both the individual and 
population levels. The agent-based model allows us both to examine individual histories and to 
understand how these histories aggregate to population level outcomes. Finally, agent-based 
simulation methods allow us to integrate existing theory into the model. For example, rather than 
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treat variance across time as exogenous, our formal modeling approach allows differences in 
variance to emerge as a consequence of organizational choices in a manner consistent with extant 
theory.  
We started with the premise that organizations are engaged in trial-and-error adaptation 
intended to enhance their performance in the face of selection pressure. We make three central 
assumptions in constructing our model: (1) the characteristics of the adaptation process are 
determined by organizations’ search strategies, which we treat as fixed over time; (2) selection is 
myopic, occurring on the basis of performance at one point in the midst of this adaptation 
process; and (3) the efficacy of selection is assessed based on realized future performance. We 
began by examining a baseline model in which we assessed the efficacy of selection across 
organizations employing a very simple, fully blind adaptation strategy. Over the subsequent four 
experiments, we compared the baseline model to alternative implementations of trial-and-error 
search strategies that varied in reliability.  
Our central finding from the simulations is that the efficacy with which selection 
discriminates among adaptive organizations, and as a consequence, the ability of selection to 
drive population-level adaptation, is a function of the process of organizational change itself. 
Search strategies that lead to learning outcomes that exhibit high reliability are more selectable in 
that selection is less prone to error when acting across firms that are pursuing highly reliable 
strategies. Thus the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level adaptation is 
endogenous to firms’ search strategies. 
SELECTION ACROSS ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONS  
Our concern is with the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level 
adaptation. Selection acts by removing inferior organizations from the population, but 
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evolutionary theory does not imply that selection processes lead to optimal outcomes (Winter, 
1964). As Simon (1991: 166) noted, “evolutionists sometimes talk about survival of the fittest. 
But in fact, natural selection only predicts that survivors will be fit enough, that is, fitter than 
their losing competitors.” While the term “fitter” implies non-random elimination of less-fit 
organizations, it leaves open a wide range of possible outcomes. Selection may lead to less than 
optimal outcomes for two reasons. First, there may be errors in selection at any point in time.  
For example, consider ten organizations, only three of which will survive selection. Ranking the 
organizations in terms of performance, if selection is perfectly effective, then only the three top 
organizations should survive. If, in contrast, selection is error prone, such that the top 
organization fails and those ranked second through fourth survive, then selection will have 
increased average fitness but would not have been perfectly effective. Second, less salient in this 
discourse but perhaps more important in an organizational context, is that the entities over which 
selection is operating may themselves be changing over time. In part, this lack of attention in the 
literature may stem from the importance put on stable organizational traits in evolutionary 
arguments (Cohen, et al., 1996). Yet, as the biological analogy suggests, a fixed genetic structure 
need not imply a fixed phenotype. Consider the obvious case of human development from fragile 
newborn to robust toddler, sprouting adolescent, and mature and eventually elderly adult. 
Clearly, selection at intermediate points in this developmental process, even if it is optimal in 
terms of removing the weakest individuals at a given point in time, may not be optimal over time 
because it removes slower developing individuals who may eventually exhibit superior 
attributes. In the context of selection across adaptive organizations, even optimal selection in the 
short term need not generate optimal long-run outcomes. 
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The fact that selection forces operate on entities that themselves are undergoing a 
dynamic process of adaptation raises an important issue about the efficacy of selection in an 
organizational context. A key factor underlying firms’ heterogeneity and, in turn, forming the 
basis for differential selection, is the fact that organizations engage in different strategies as to 
how they go about establishing an economically viable entity. It is well recognized that distinct 
strategies may imply differential long-run performance and, as a consequence, may have a 
significant impact on organizations’ survival prospects. It is less well recognized that distinct 
strategies, because they imply the possibility that they will unfold differently over time, may also 
have an impact on organizations’ survival prospects independent of long-run performance.  
In our modeling, we focus on the implications of organizational adaptation for the 
efficacy with which selection processes identify organizations that will be superior in the long-
run and remove those that will be inferior. The existing literature in population ecology and 
organization theory more broadly has focused significant attention on a related but different 
issue, the implications of organizational change for the mortality risk of individual firms. In 
doing so, this literature has identified two broad classes of mortality risks: the first related to risk 
associated with the content of change and the second related to risk in the process of change. In 
both cases, organizational change, even if it has long-run positive performance implications, may 
have short-run negative performance implications that increase mortality. 
Risks in the content of change reflect the problems faced by boundedly rational firms in 
identifying a suitable destination state or desired set of outcomes. Change from the existing state 
to a new state entails a significant mortality risk, as the information required to evaluate the 
performance consequences of such a change may not be available. Moreover, change to a very 
distant destination state (exploration) entails more risk than change to an adjacent state 
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(exploitation or local search), as adjacent states are more likely to result in similar performance. 
Thus change leads to instability because organizations implement changes that may have 
detrimental performance. The instability associated with risk in the content of change arises 
because of the difficulty of evaluating alternatives without actually implementing them. At the 
stable extreme, “off-line” evaluation of alternative destination states (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000), using cognitive representations to evaluate alternatives without implementing them, 
reduces content risk by eliminating the worst alternatives prior to exposing them to selection 
forces. At the unstable extreme, content risk is greater when search is blind, because “specific 
correct trials are no more likely to occur…than specific incorrect trials” (Campbell, 1982: 86). 
Where search is blind, alternatives must be implemented and subjected to selection in order to 
assess their value. Content risk thus reflects the intelligence embodied by change efforts – the 
ability (or inability) to evaluate alternatives and select only those that have positive and 
immediate effects on performance. 
Process risks reflect the problems that arise because of the embedded nature of 
organizational structures. Theory distinguishes between changes in core and peripheral 
organizational elements (Thompson, 1967; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Levinthal, 1997). Core 
elements of structure are, by definition, those that are highly interdependent with other 
organizational elements. In the microcomputer industry, Romanelli and Tushman (1994: 1147) 
argued that organizational culture, strategy, structure, power distributions, and control systems 
constitute core elements. In Silicon Valley start-ups, Baron, Burton, and Hannan (1999) studied 
founders’ “organizational blueprints” as a core organizational feature that dictates the extent of 
formal organizational structures that serve as control and coordination mechanisms. Although 
changes in peripheral elements are considered to be feasible, research has called into question the 
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survival benefit of changes in core elements (Singh, House, and Tucker, 1986; Haveman, 1992; 
Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Barnett and Carroll, 1995; Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll, 
2003). The risk of change in core organizational features arises because change requires 
significant adjustments across a wide variety of interdependent organizational elements and this 
in turn engenders instability. Even small changes in core elements may set off a cascade of 
related changes that disrupt existing organizational linkages, disturb communication channels 
across organizational boundaries, and disable routines (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). The risk of 
mortality is further increased because content and process issues interact – interdependence 
across core elements of the organization makes it more difficult to evaluate the performance 
consequences of a change in content.  
One strategy organizations use to manage the problem of the complexities of change is to 
engage in the change processes sequentially rather than in parallel, making individual changes to 
organizational content in one domain, while holding all else constant. That said, at higher levels 
of interdependence, firms may need to make concurrent changes across multiple organizational 
elements (Rivkin, 2000; Sorenson, 2003), and attempts to do otherwise introduce significant 
organizational instability. For example, Sorenson (2003), in a study of the effects of the 
interdependence associated with the co-production of components among computer workstation 
manufacturers, found that interdependence retards performance and increases mortality in all but 
high velocity environments. Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004), in a simulation study of organizational 
adaptation demonstrated that reciprocal interdependence (Thompson, 1967) leads to significant 
instability in the face of local search, which can only be overcome by imposing a strict hierarchy. 
To the extent that organizational age (and to a lesser extent, size) is a suitable proxy for 
routines and elaborated organizational structure, empirical work has documented a correlation 
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between age and mortality in the face of change (Delacroix and Swaminathan, 1991; Kelly and 
Amburgey, 1991; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993; Miller and Chen, 1994). Highlighting the 
role of organizational structures and routines, Dobrev, Kim and Carroll (2003) demonstrated, in a 
study of the US auto industry, that change requiring a reorientation of structures and the 
introduction of novel routines increases the risk of failure, but change building on existing 
structures and routines does not. That said, results in many studies have been mixed (Baum and 
Amburgey, 2001), in part because age (and size) is a proxy not only for structure but also for 
accumulated resources. For example, research has highlighted the strategic choices that older and 
larger firms make to buffer themselves from failure (Miner, Amburgey, and Stearns, 1990; 
Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994). 
The organizations literature in general and the population ecology literature in particular 
thus suggest that change itself exposes a firm to risk (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Miner, 
Amburgey, and Sterns, 1990; Haveman, 1992; Amburgey, Kelly, and Barnett, 1993) arising from 
the difficulty of identifying a suitable destination state (content risk) and interdependence among 
elements of the elaborated structure (process risk). The causal chain reflects the argument that 
content and process issues give rise to reductions in the reliability of performance over time that, 
in turn, increase the risk of mortality. Still unaddressed however is the related question of what 
the consequences of reduced reliability would be for the efficacy of selection as a driver of 
population level adaptation. 
If selection is to be effective, it must be able to identify organizations at intermediate 
points in time that will be superior in the long-run. This challenge reflects the difficulties in 
estimating future performance. Although selection processes may operate through a variety of 
mechanisms, inevitably, selection must be based on current and past performance. Even if 
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selection processes such as financial markets are forward looking, information about future 
performance expectations can be based only on current and past data and outcomes. For instance, 
the early performance of a new venture-capital-backed technology firm – such as the extent to 
which it has achieved its early sales milestone – can be used to assess its potential. Similarly, in 
educational contexts, standardized testing is used to assess students’ future educational 
performance. In both cases, the intermediate manifestations of performance before the adaptation 
process is complete may provide only a noisy signal about long-term performance. More 
generally, it is unclear to what extent the intermediate performance manifestations of adapting 
organizations provide a good signal about future performance. 
In our modeling, we focus on how heterogeneity across organizations in reliability during 
the adaptation process affects the quality of the information on which selection acts and, in turn, 
the efficacy of selection. We illustrate how the information content of current performance as it 
applies to predicting future performance decreases as the instability with which adaptation 
proceeds increases. 
The structure of the model closely reflects its theoretical foundation in the population 
ecology and organizations literature. Organizations engage in a process of local search for 
alternatives (Cyert and March, 1963; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Stuart and Podolny, 1996). In 
such a process, the set of potential destination states is limited to those near to the origin state, 
and the correlation in performance over time is high relative to exploratory search. But even in 
local search processes, organizational search choices affect the adaptive dynamics. Building on 
the prior literature discussed above, the reliability of adaptation is, in part, jointly the result of 
differences across firms in how search is pursued with regard to (1) the mode by which 
alternatives are evaluated which affects the degree of content risk and (2) the imposition of 
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organizational structure (integrated vs. functional), which affects the degree of process risk. The 
imposition of structure may be further refined in terms of how effort is allocated over time across 
elements of structure (parallel vs. sequential allocation of effort). Taken together, we denote 
these choices collectively as a search strategy, a coherent set of rules governing learning. We 
have chosen to model the mode of evaluation and the nature of organizational structures because 
they closely reflect the theoretical foundations of the population ecology literature’s focus on 
reliability, although other elements of search strategies, not modeled here, may also contribute to 
differential reliability. 
First, evaluation to assess the performance impact of an alternative may be conducted on-
line or off-line. For on-line evaluation, an organization must implement that alternative in order 
to assess its implications for performance. As such, on-line evaluation reflects the content risk 
associated with the difficulties embodied in identifying a destination state for change. Off-line 
evaluation allows an organization to implement only those alternatives that are believed to lead 
to performance improvements. Off-line evaluation decreases the content risk of mortality but 
does not necessarily eliminate it, because the a priori screening of alternatives may well be 
imperfect. Although , on average, both methods of evaluation allow organizations to proceed in 
the direction that leads to marginal performance gains, off-line evaluation does so with greater 
stability. 
Second, search strategies can differ in how organizations structure the problem-solving 
search effort. We considered an underlying task structure in which the problem facing 
organizations can be divided into two sub problems, such as research and development (R&D) 
and marketing; or domestic and international business. Given the important role of 
organizational structure in structural inertia theory, we examined how different structures affect 
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the degree of reliability over time during adaptation. The simplest organizational structure is 
fully integrated. In this structure, the organization does not treat the problem as decomposable. 
For example, there are no separate marketing and R&D departments. Instead, search is structured 
in an integrated manner across both sub problems. In this sense, firms search across one large 
problem landscape. Alternatively, organizations may employ a functional structure consisting of 
two functional units, such as separate R&D and marketing departments. Each functional unit 
focuses on a particular sub problem and as such, firms engage in local search on two distinct sub 
problem landscapes.  
If an organization has a functional structure, a set of search rules governing the allocation 
of resources across the functional units must be considered. Two fundamentally different search 
strategies are possible: parallel and sequential. In parallel search strategies, the organization 
allocates its search effort evenly across both units. In sequential search strategies, it first devotes 
all search effort to one unit, and only starts searching across the other after it has made a certain 
degree of progress on the first. As an example of sequential search, entrepreneurial firms in the 
technology sectors often address the problem of marketing only after technological search has 
yielded a working prototype. Parallel search enables integrated trial-and-error learning across the 
entire system, which tends to reveal problems more rapidly and in doing so, stimulates learning. 
At the same time, this tight-coupling approach tends to decrease the rate of early performance 
improvement. This problem arises as adaptation in one domain, which improves performance 
locally, negatively affects performance in the other domains, and thus leads to remedial action. 
In contrast, sequential search purposefully suppresses learning in one domain in order to enhance 
learning in another (Baldwin and Clark, 2000), producing superior early performance gains in 
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one unit at the expense of reduced over time inter-temporal stability (i.e. a non-monotonic 
learning curve). 
The challenge to the efficacy of selection across organizations in the midst of adaptation 
is identifying the organizations that will have superior long-run performance. The selection 
process is significantly confounded by organizational heterogeneity in search strategies that 
affect both long-run performance and the reliability of performance over time as the organization 
moves toward the long run performance outcome. In particular, the path of adaptation over time 
can be characterized by two basic types of reliability exhibited by organizational learning curves: 
short-wave reliability and long-wave reliability, as depicted by the grey learning curves in figure 
1. While short-wave reliability (figure 1a) reflects near term performance cycling, long-wave 
reliability (figure 1b) reflects non-monotonicity in performance improvement such that the rate 
of performance improvement varies considerably over time. To the extent that adaptation is 
unreliable, selection is less effective at identifying organizations that will be superior in the long- 
run. In this sense, the efficacy of selection is endogenous to the organizational search strategies 
that drive differential adaptation trajectories. In our computational model of adaptation, we 
examine systematic differences in reliability across organizations and the effect of those 
differences on the information available in the selection process.  
  
--- Insert Figure 1 about here --- 
 
 - 19 -   
COMPUTATIONAL MODEL OF ADAPTATION IN THE PRESENCE OF 
INTERMEDIATE SELECTION 
We developed an agent-based simulation model to examine the efficacy of selection 
across heterogeneous organizations undergoing adaptation. We built our model on two central 
assumptions, discussed above: (1) that adaptation is the result of local search among policy 
choices guided by search strategies and (2) selection occurs on the basis of current performance 
outcomes. We employed as an analytical tool the NK model developed by Kauffman (1993), 
which has found growing acceptance in the management literature in studies of search 
(Levinthal, 1997), imitation (Rivkin, 2001), organizational structure (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 
2003), and organizational architecture (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). The basic model consists of 
a structure for defining a fitness landscape (the problem space to be searched), search rules that 
guide adaptation, and a selection mechanism. Each of these elements is briefly characterized 
below and a detailed mathematical treatment is included in the Appendix.  
Landscape Structure and Fitness Functions 
Our primary objective was to explore how the process of adaptation affects the efficacy 
of selection. We modeled a task environment consisting of two interconnected sub problem 
landscapes (e.g., R&D and marketing; domestic and international activity, etc.). The payoff to a 
set of choices in one problem domain, or landscape depends on the choices made in the other. 
We assumed that the boundaries of these two landscapes, along with the level of 
interdependencies between them, were defined exogenously and thus were not subject to 
managerial discretion in the short term. Our modeling of this task environment is related to 
recent efforts to study issues of organizational design (Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow 
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and Levinthal, 2003; Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004), in which interactions across sub-problems 
(landscapes) play a central role.  
A set of choices about how an organization wishes to compete and operate is represented 
as a location in policy space characterized by a vector of policy choices, 11 1 11 nN =(a ,...,a ) , and 
2
2 2 2
1 n
N =(a ,...,a ) , of lengths 1n  and 2n , respectively, where the superscript represents the 
landscape (sub problem), and the subscript represents the policy choice. We let each policy 
choice correspond to a particular binary decision variable, where, for example, the choice of 1 
might imply the choice of using flash memory rather than a disk drive in the design of a new 
portable music player. Consider the example in Figure 2. An organization's location on each 
landscape is represented by vectors of length 1 2n =n =4 , such that 1 1 1 1 11 2 3 4N =a a a a  and 
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 3 4N =a a a a . Thus there are 
1 2n n 42 =2 =2  possible combinations of policy choices in each space. 
The firm's position in the overall landscape can be represented by the vector N  of length 
1 2n=n +n , such that 1 21 2 1 1 2 21 1n nN={N ,N }=(a ,...,a ,a ,...,a ) . 
---------------        Insert Figure 2 about here     ---------------- 
Interactions between policy choices can occur both within a landscape and across 
landscapes (Simon, 1962). As an example, a within sub problem interaction in R&D would be 
the interaction between a laptop’s weight and screen size, while an across sub problem 
interaction might occur between R&D and marketing in the form of an interaction between a 
laptop’s weight and choice of consumer versus business sales channels. Interactions within a 
landscape are characterized by the vector WjK (length 
Wk ) of policy choices with which policy 
1
ja  (or 
2
ja ) interacts on its own landscape (where j indexes the policy choice). The example in 
figure 2 demonstrates the interaction space in which Wk =2  (landscape 1 in the upper-left 
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quadrant and landscape 2 in the lower right which represent two sub problems). In the example, 
the payoff to policy 11a  (choice of 0 or 1) in landscape 1 is a function of the choices made for the 
policies in the vector W 1 11 2 3K =(a ,a ) , this relationship between policies is characterized by an “x” 
in the appropriate cell. In the example in figure 2, if we let 1 1 1 1 11 2 3 4N =a a a a =1110 , then 
W
1K =(1,1) , 
and the fitness contribution of policy choice 11a  is a function of selecting a 1 for bit 
1
1a , as well as 
selecting 12a =1 and 
1
3a =1. Changing to 
1
3a =0  would alter the fitness contribution made by the 
choice of 11a =1, while the policy choice setting for 
1
4a =1 or 0  has no effect on the fitness 
contribution of 11a .  
Interactions across landscapes are characterized by the vector BjK  (length 
Bk ) of policy 
choices in the other landscape that affect the performance contribution of a policy choice in the 
focal landscape (the "o"s in the upper right and lower left). That is, interdependencies across 
activities on the two landscapes complicate the learning process as search activity in one domain 
both informs and affects progress in the other. In the example, with Bk =1 , the fitness 
contribution of 11a  is also a function of the choices made for the policies in the vector 
2
1 2( )
BK a= . 
In total, the payoff associated with an individual policy choice is conditional on all policy 
choices (within and across landscapes) with which it interacts. In our example, the pay-off 
associated with policy choice 1 in landscape 1, 11a , is 
1 1 W B 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2π (a |K ,K )=π (a |a ,a ,a ) . The payoffs to 
each of the 
W B1+k +k2  distinct vectors associated with a policy choice are generated by a draw from 
a uniform distribution u[0,1].  
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The fitness associated with a position on landscape 1, 1N , is simply the average of the 
fitness contributions of each of the individual policy choices, such that 
1n
1 1 1 W B
j j j j j1
j=1
1
Π = π (a |K ,K )
n ∑ . 
There is a analogous expression for the fitness associated with 2N . The total fitness is the 
average fitness across landscapes, such that 1 2j j j
1
Π = (Π +Π )
2
.  
Rules Governing Search 
Search takes the form of local trial-and-error learning which corresponds to “hill 
climbing” in a multiple peaked performance landscape (Levinthal, 1997). Search is performed by 
evaluating the consequences for fitness of changing a randomly selected policy choice Lja  where 
L is landscape 1 or 2. Search strategies can differ both in how alternatives are evaluated and in 
the imposition of organizational structure.  
Evaluation reflects the mechanism by which the alternatives identified in the trial-and-
error search process are assessed and, in particular, the difference between blind and non-blind 
search. On-line evaluation reflects a context in which it is not possible to determine the value of 
a change in a single policy element, without implementing the change (Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000). Thus “specific correct trials are no more likely to occur…than specific incorrect trials” 
(Campbell, 1982: 86). As a consequence, fitness at the end of the period may be either higher or 
lower than at the beginning of the period. If fitness is lower then in the next period, the 
organization returns to its earlier position and attempts to test another policy choice. Once all 
single policy choice changes have been examined and found to be inferior, search ceases. In 
contrast, off-line evaluation is such that, if performance is improved by making the change, it is 
implemented (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000), otherwise the potential policy change is discarded. 
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As such, off-line evaluation entails search in which incorrect trials are not subjected to 
population selection, and as such, off-line search is non-blind. Off-line evaluation is possible 
when the efficacy of a choice can be determined using such things as cognitive evaluation, 
computer models, structured experiments, animal models, or prototypes. For instance, a 
particular combination of chemicals may be evaluated in vivo in a laboratory, without having to 
test it directly by selling the chemical in the product market. 
Organizational structure reflects differences in the set of constraints imposed on the 
search process. We implemented two alternative structures. The first structure is integrated. In 
this structure, an organization chooses a policy choice to evaluate from the entire set of 
1 2
1 2 1 1 2 2
1 1n n
N={N ,N }=(a ,...,a ,a ,...,a )  policies, with evaluation based on the change in fitness across the 
global landscape. The second structure is functional, in which the organization chooses a 
multidivisional structure that matches that of the task environment. Thus the organization is 
divided into two functional sub-units, with search constrained to within-unit policy changes. 
When search is conducted in unit 1, only policy choices 1 1 1 1 11 2 3 4N =a a a a  may be examined, and 
only the consequences for local unit 1’s performance are evaluated. As noted earlier, the 
functional structure entails two further sets of choices. Effort can be allocated in parallel or 
sequentially. In parallel allocation, in each period, the organization attempts one search effort in 
each functional unit. In sequential allocation, in the early periods (prior to period 30), the 
organization allocates all resources to search in the first landscape, and only in later periods does 
search begin in the second landscape.  
-------- Insert Figure 3 about here -------- 
Figure 3 highlights a typology of search strategies that arise at the intersection of modes 
of evaluation and the imposition of organizational structure. We implemented four types of 
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search strategies covering four of the quadrants (and sub-quadrants) of figure 3: (Q1) Baseline: 
an integrated structure with on-line evaluation – which represents the simplest search strategy; 
(Q2) Integrated: an integrated structure with off-line evaluation; (Q3a) Parallel: a functional 
structure with parallel allocation of effort and off-line evaluation; and finally (Q3b) Sequential: a 
functional structure with sequential allocation of effort and off-line evaluation. 
Selection 
Because we were interested in the efficiency of selection, we modeled adaptation and 
selection (organizational exit) without considering the entry of replacement organizations.1 
Selection regimes vary in their intensity – weak versus strong. Selection was implemented as the 
outcome of a stochastic process such that an organization’s probability of survival is a function 
of its fitness relative to the fitness of the best firm at a given point in time (Wilson and Bossert, 
1971). We implemented a proportional selection model, such that the probability of survival at a 
given point in time is ( ) tZi,t i,t ts = Π /Max(Π ) , where i,tΠ  is the fitness of organization i at time t, 
tMax(Π )  is the maximum fitness achieved by any firm at time t; and tZ  is the strength of 
selection. The proportional selection model imposes competitive consequences on organizations 
because the probability of failure for a given organization increases with fitness of the leading 
organization in the population at any point in time.2 
SIMULATIONS  
We used the fitness landscape described above as an analytical tool to analyze the 
efficacy of selection across alternative search strategies. All simulations are for an n=20  
landscape consisting of two sub problems where each sub problem corresponds to a single 
landscape with 1 2n =n =10  interdependent policy choices. This in turn generates approximately 
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one million ( 202 )policy choice combinations represented by unique locations on the combined 
landscape. The interaction structure within each sub-landscape is specified as Wk =5 , with Bk =2  
interactions across landscapes. A simulation run lasts for 100 periods and includes 200 
organizations seeded randomly on the landscape. In each period, an organization is allocated two 
search attempts. All results are averaged over 100 runs, and thus we evaluated the performance 
of a total of 20,000 organizations in each simulation. Our analysis proceeded in four 
experiments. In the first experiment, we examined the dynamics of performance improvement 
and, in particular, the reliability of adaptation across alternative search strategies. In the second 
experiment, we examined the efficacy of continuous selection (on the basis of current 
performance) within populations of organizations that were homogeneous in terms of search 
strategies. In doing so, we assessed how different strategies affected the ability of selection to act 
as a mechanism of population-level adaptation, to determine if there are differences across 
strategies in selectability – the information content of current performance that allows selection 
to screen out organizations in a manner corresponding to their long-run performance. In the third 
experiment, we examined alternative selection regimes, first by enabling selection on the basis of 
past as well as current performance and, second, by implementing discrete selection at a single 
point in time. In the final experiment, we allowed organizations pursuing different search 
strategies to compete and examined the implications of differences across strategies in 
selectability for the demographics of surviving firms.  
Experiment 1: Reliability of Alternative Search Strategies 
We began by assessing the performance trajectories of alternative search strategies in the 
absence of selection. We did so by running independent simulations for each of the four distinct 
search strategies in quadrants 1 through 3 in Figure 3 above. Results are presented in figures 4a-
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4c: (a) average performance across time; (b) cross-sectional variation (standard deviation of 
fitness across firms) within the population of organizations following a given strategy; and (c) 
intertemporal short wave reliability measured as ( )t-1 tCorr F ,F . The central performance measure 
of fitness in figure 4a shows that although the rate of performance increase differs markedly 
across the strategies, all four strategies appear to generate a common asymptote with an average 
fitness of .69. In fact, the long-run results are not quite identical, although they are 
indistinguishable at the three-digit level. In particular, functional parallel strategies, by 
generating perturbations in one landscape that have an impact on search in the other landscape, 
periodically enable firms to escape a poor basin of attraction for a basin with a superior local 
peak. But , these differences in long-run performance across strategies are only noticeable at 
higher levels of cross-landscape interdependence than was implemented in this paper and have 
no bearing on our results. 
--------------- Insert Figure 4 about here  ---------------- 
All strategies use the same amount of effort in the search process. Thus differences in the 
rate of progress can only come from differences in search strategy performance characteristics 
driven by the mode of evaluation and the imposition of organizational structure. The central 
qualitative observation is that the baseline and sequential strategies not only exhibit slower rates 
of progress but also entail far greater cross-sectional variability, as shown in figures 4b. For the 
baseline strategy, these observed results can be attributed to the on-line evaluation, which results 
in some fraction of alternatives generating performance decrements. These errors lead to a 
significant reduction in short-wave reliability that both decreases the rate of performance 
improvement and increases cross-sectional variation, particularly between periods 15 and 25, as 
shown in figure 4c.  
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Less obvious is the sharp contrast in behavior among the three search strategies that entail 
off-line evaluation of alternatives (Quadrants 2 and 3 in figure 3). Integrated search, which 
differs from the baseline strategy because it implements only performance-enhancing 
alternatives, precedes with greater reliability and, as a consequence, more rapidly than baseline 
strategy search. The two functional search strategies, parallel and sequential, match the 
underlying task structure by imposing organizational structure and decomposing the problem 
across two functional units. For example, while marketing and R&D functions may be 
interconnected in terms of solutions, firms typically decompose the problem across two 
functional units. Functional search strategies ignore the between-unit interdependence in 
activities and outcomes because doing so reduces coordination costs.  
Despite this commonality, the dynamics of performance of parallel and sequential search 
strategies are markedly different. The parallel-strategy firms exhibit performance that closely 
matches that of the integrated-strategy firms. In contrast, sequential-strategy firms, by focusing 
on only one landscape in the early periods, limit the potential for performance improvement. In 
particular, the potential improvement is on average half that of the potential improvement that a 
parallel strategy firm can expect. Sequential strategy firms, however, exhibit even higher levels 
of short-wave reliability in early periods by allocating all their search effort to one sub problem 
landscape. This higher early reliability leads to rapid early performance gains that are quickly 
offset by the limited room for improvement in the landscape in which search efforts are initially 
focused. In addition, this decoupling of search introduces a second issue: the adaptation 
trajectory of sequential-strategy firms is highly non-monotonic. After period 30, when sequential 
organizations commence search in the second landscape, fitness improves dramatically, cross 
sectional variation decreases, and short wave reliability returns to pre-period 30 levels. 
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All search strategies examined in the first experiment led to adaptation that converged to 
a common long-run performance. Nevertheless, differences across search strategies in the mode 
of evaluation of alternatives and the implementation of organizational structure gave rise to 
significant differences in the level of short-wave reliability. This property, in turn, drove both the 
rate of performance improvement and the level of cross-sectional variation. 
Experiment 2: Implications of Reliability for the Efficacy of Selection 
In the second experiment, we examined the consequences of differences in reliability for 
the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level adaptation, to assess the extent to 
which selection increases average population-level performance across the different search 
strategies by eliminating inferior firms. Our proposition is that selection will be more effective at 
identifying superior firms when those firms pursue search strategies that exhibit higher levels of 
reliability in the adaptation process.  
We ran this experiment under two different selection regimes: (1) weak selection which 
removes approximately 50 percent of the population over the 100-period experiment, and (2) 
strong selection, which eliminates approximately 95 percent of firms over 100 periods. The 
performance variable of interest was the average improvement in population-level fitness 
generated by selection, as it removes organizations deemed to be inferior, normalized by the 
baseline adaptation results. The results are presented in figures 5a (weak selection) and 5b 
(strong selection). The figures show that strong selection over a population of integrated-search 
firms increases fitness 9.34 percent more than does such selection across a population of firms 
pursuing the baseline adaptation model. Because the results are consistent across both regimes 
(although less intense in the weak selection regime), we focus our discussion on the strong 
selection regime.  
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---------------          Insert Figure 5a-5b about here     ---------------- 
Under the strong selection regime, both integrated and parallel search strategies 
outperform the baseline search strategy in terms of long-run fitness improvement, by 9.34 and 
3.85 percent, respectively, suggesting that selection is more effective at increasing population-
level performance across either integrated or parallel search than the baseline search strategy. In 
addition, the difference in improvement between integrated and parallel search is large, given 
that the results from experiment 1 that showed only relatively small differences in short-wave 
reliability. This highlights an as yet unexplored cost of decomposing problems into constituent 
parts. Even small differences in reliability that arise through the imposition of organizational 
structure can alter the ability of selection to facilitate effective population-level adaptation. 
The results for the sequential search strategy are more complex. Selection-driven 
performance improvements are an order of magnitude larger for sequential search in the early 
periods, reaching a peak of 250 percent of the rate exhibited by the baseline search strategy, but 
this dissipates rapidly with the activation of search efforts related to the second sub problem 
(landscape 2). In the long-run, selection across firms pursuing a sequential search strategy is less 
effective than equivalent selection across the baseline blind-search model by 6.7 percent.  
----------Insert Table 1 about here --------- 
To assess the significance of these differences in long run performance contingent on 
surviving selection, we conducted unpaired t-tests of the mean performance across each strategy 
at period 100. The results of this test for the strong selection regime are presented in table 1. 
Each data point in the table contains the difference in fitness at period 100 as the column less the 
row. Thus after selection, the average fitness of a population of firms pursuing the integrated 
search strategy is .0047 greater than that of a population of firms pursuing the baseline strategy, a 
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difference that is highly significant at the .001 level. There are two central results from this table. 
First, selection is significantly less effective across firms pursuing the baseline blind search 
strategy than either the integrated or the parallel strategies. Second, selection is significantly less 
effective across the sequential strategy than all the other search strategies examined.  
---------------          Insert figure 6 about here     ---------------- 
To examine why selection is more or less effective across some search strategies, we 
conducted two further sets of analyses. First, we calculated the selection-error rate observed at 
period 100 to determine how many of the firms (out of 200) that survived selection were actually 
in the top 100 firms in period 100. The results of this analysis, which are presented in figure 6, 
are read as follows: in the weak selection regime with firms pursuing the baseline search 
strategy, of the 102 firms that survive selection, 41 of the surviving firms were not in the top 102 
of the 200 firms, thus generating a 39-percent error rate. In general, the results of the error-rate 
analysis are consistent with the performance-improvement examination. A shift from the 
baseline search strategy to integrated search leads to a decrease in the error rate from 71 percent 
to 65 percent, with the error rate increasing to 66 percent for parallel search, consistent with the 
long-term performance differences exhibited in figure 5b. The error rate across sequential search 
was the highest observed, at 77 percent.  
Thus the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level adaptation, highlighted 
by differences in population fitness under selection, is driven by the extent to which the selection 
process is error prone, removing organizations in earlier periods that would have gone on to do 
well if they had survived. In particular, for all search strategies except sequential search, there 
appears to be a strong relationship between the extent of short-wave reliability and selection-
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error rates. As short-wave reliability increases, error rates appear to decrease, and selection 
becomes more effective. 
Second, we examined the nature of information available for selection at a given point in 
time, focusing on how heterogeneity across organizations in the reliability of adaptation affects 
the quality of the information on which selection acts. The challenge over time for selection is in 
estimating future performance. To what extent do the intermediate performance manifestations 
of adapting organizations provide a good signal about future performance? If differences across 
search strategies affect the degree of reliability of adaptation, then this may distort the 
information provided by contemporaneous performance, rendering it less informative about 
long-run performance and in turn limiting the effectiveness of intermediate selection. 
To examine this issue, we measured long-wave reliability by calculating the extent to 
which fitness at a given point in time is correlated with long-run fitness, ( )t 100Corr F ,F , which 
provides a direct measure of the informativeness of intermediate performance levels. For 
example, if the correlation between fitness at period 30 and 100 is 100 percent, then fitness at 
period 30 is perfectly informative about long-run fitness. If, in contrast, the correlation is only 5 
percent, then intermediate fitness provides little useful information about long-run fitness. The 
results of this analysis are shown in figure 7, which plots the correlation in fitness between 
period t and period 100 across each of the search strategies. For example, in period 15, the 
correlation between contemporaneous and long-term fitness for the integrated strategy is 
approximately 52 percent – that is, fitness at period 15 explains 52 percent of the variance in 
long-term performance. In contrast, for the baseline blind-search strategy model, the correlation 
is only 36 percent. For the sequential strategy, the correlation drops further to 27 percent.  
---------------          Insert figure 7 about here     ---------------- 
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For the baseline, parallel, and sequential strategies, the short-wave and long-wave 
reliability results are broadly similar in terms of rank ordering. In contrast, for the sequential 
strategy, while the short wave reliability is superior to that of the baseline strategy, the long-
wave reliability is greatly inferior. This reversal stems from the temporal decomposition of the 
search effort in the sequential strategy. Because the two sub problems (landscapes) are 
interdependent, the onset of search in the second landscape in period 30 makes obsolete much of 
the firm-level learning in the first landscape. As a consequence, the selective removal of inferior 
sequential-strategy firms prior to period 30 is much more likely to be in error. The early 
performance improvement generated by selection across sequential strategy firms, shown in 
figure 5b above, leads to rapid improvement in the population’s performance and is consistent 
with the very high level of short-wave reliability that this strategy demonstrates at the outset of 
the simulation. But this advantage is quickly overwhelmed by the cost associated with a 
significant decrease in long wave reliability. In the long run, this reliability deficit leads to 
selection errors that decrease the ability of selection to act as a mechanism of population-level 
adaptation. 
Finally, we examined the extent to which our results were sensitive to differences across 
strategies in cross-sectional variation. We implemented a rank-order selection regime that was 
insensitive to cross-sectional variation. Our results (available from the authors) were robust to 
this alternative specification. Differences in cross-sectional variation do affect the efficacy of 
selection, but when there are also substantial differences in reliability across strategies, 
differences in cross-sectional variation will tend to be swamped by the contribution of these 
differences in reliability over time. 
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Experiment 3: Efficacy of Alternative Selection Regimes 
The previous experiment demonstrated that the efficacy of selection varied significantly 
across search strategies as a function of the reliability of adaptive efforts. In that experiment, 
selection was continuous, occurring in each period, and was implemented on the basis of 
contemporaneous performance alone. In the third experiment, we explored the efficacy of two 
alternative selection regimes that, although arbitrary in their construction, reflect important 
dimensions of selection regimes observed in practice: (1) continuous selection with the use of 
historical information and (2) discrete selection at period 15. 
We implemented selection on the basis of historical, rather than simply current, 
performance. We used twenty periods of historical data and ran the simulation models from 
experiment 2 to ascertain if more information enhances the efficacy of selection. As an 
indication of the efficacy of selection, we considered the error-rate results, which are reported in 
figure 8. The height of the bars represents the percentage of organizations that survive selection 
erroneously. The numbers above the bars represent the comparison with the results from 
experiment 2 graphed in figures 5a and 5b. Thus, for the baseline blind-search strategy, the use 
of historical data under a strong selection regime led to an error rate of 71 percent, which is a 
reduction of 1.22 percent relative to the error rate observed in experiment 2 (e.g., current 
performance only). In contrast, for the integrated, parallel, and sequential strategies, the error rate 
increased by 6.68, 8.53, and 4.44 percent, respectively.  
---------------          Insert figure 8 about here     ---------------- 
The results are informative in two respects. First, for the more reliable strategies 
(integrated, parallel), historical data are less useful predictors of future success than is current 
performance, because performance at any point in time for these monotonic strategies provides 
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information on the lower bound of the local peak and therefore historical performance data from 
points lower down the peak is less informative about future performance than is current 
performance. Thus the counterintuitive result is that including historical data diminishes the 
efficacy of selection by increasing error rates. Second, for the less reliable strategies, which 
exhibit non-monotonic performance gains, the results diverge. The baseline strategy suffers from 
a deficit of short-wave reliability. Because adaptation is blind, in any given period, the 
organization may implement a trial that reduces performance. Here, the use of historical data, 
which in effect averages backward, captures prior-period results that were at times superior 
(higher up the local peak) to the current period, thus providing better information on which 
selection could act and resulting in a lower error rate. In contrast, sequential search suffers from 
a deficit in long-wave reliability. In this case, the use of historical data implies that after period 
30 (the onset of landscape 2 search), pre-period 30 data are still considered, and as a 
consequence, the error rate increases. 
Discrete selection represents a regime with intermittent rather than continuous selection 
and is in this sense similar to that of a of venture capital regime. We examined the outcome of a 
discrete selection event at period 15. Error-rate results on the efficacy of selection are reported in 
figure 9. The main result is that discrete selection exhibits a higher selection-error rate than does 
continuous selection. Under the weak selection regime, the error rate increase is between 16.7 
and 33.1 percent. Under the strong selection regime, the increase in error rates ranges from 6.7 to 
15.1 percent. Two observations are of note. First, error rates grow faster under the weak selection 
regime. Second, the implementation of discrete selection, rather than continuous selection, 
comes at a cost that differs across search strategies. In particular, although the basic pattern of 
the efficacy of selection across alternative search strategies remains constant, the error rate 
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increases faster across the less reliable baseline and sequential strategies than it does across the 
more reliable integrated and parallel strategies. The largest increase in error rate occurs in 
selection over the sequential strategy. The efficacy of the results from discrete selection, 
however, will be partly a function of the time at which selection is implemented. Because our 
interest was in modeling a selection regime similar to that of venture capital, we examined early 
selection, but as the time of discrete selection moves later, the efficacy of selection will improve. 
At the extreme, with selection at period 100, selection will simply be proportionate to long-run 
performance. 
---------------          Insert figure 9 about here     ---------------- 
The results of experiment 3 suggest that the general ranking of alternative strategies in 
terms of selectability remains relatively unchanged under alternative selection regimes. As one 
would expect, a decrease in information on which selection acts (discrete selection) reduces the 
efficacy of selection, though this reduction in efficacy is less severe in a strong selection regime. 
Counterintuitively, the results suggest that in most cases, the use of more information (historical 
selection) also serves to reduce the efficacy of selection. 
Experiment 4: Competitive Implications of Differences in Selectability 
The previous three experiments demonstrated that the efficacy of selection varies 
significantly across search strategies as a function of the reliability of adaptation. In experiment 
4, we examined the consequences of differences across strategies in selectability when two 
organizational forms (i.e., sets of organizations pursuing different search strategies) are 
competing for dominance in a population. Each simulation involved 100 runs of the model with 
200 firms split between the two competing search strategy types.  
---------------          Insert figures 10 and 11 about here     ---------------- 
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Two central measures that are of interest are the relative proportion of survivors of each 
type of organization and the probability that a given type of organization will be the winning 
organization. We ran six separate simulations (three each under the weak and strong selection 
regimes) in which populations of two types of firms compete: (a) baseline vs. integrated, (b) 
baseline vs. parallel, and (c) baseline vs. sequential. In the absence of selection, all four strategies 
(Quadrants 1 through 3 in figure 3) generate identical long-run performance. Contingent on 
surviving selection, however, this equifinality disappears. Figure 10 illustrates the population 
demographics results, the proportion of survivors in period 100 that are non-baseline strategy 
firms. Figure 11 illustrates the winner of the competition, graphing the probability that a non-
baseline strategy firm has (or is tied for) the highest performance at period 100. On the basis of 
both performance metrics, the integrated and parallel strategies generate superior outcomes in 
competition with the baseline strategy. For example, under strong selection, the integrated 
strategy firms come to account for 63 percent of the population of surviving firms and an 
integrated strategy firm exhibits the highest performance amongst the survivors nearly 80 percent 
of the time. In contrast, the sequential strategy firms loose to baseline strategy firms on both 
performance metrics. The results suggest that differences in the efficacy of selection (driven by 
differential reliability) across strategies have direct implications for the outcome of competition 
between alternative organizational forms. Because selection is more error prone within the 
populations of less reliable search strategies, many of the latently superior members of such sub-
populations are mistakenly eliminated, significantly reducing the likelihood that one such 
organization will be the winner. As a consequence, organizations pursuing search strategies that 
are more reliable, exhibiting superior selectability, come to dominate the population of surviving 
organizations. In this sense, reliability and survival are correlated even when selection occurs on 
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the basis of performance. This final experiment highlights differential selectability, driven by 
differences in the reliability of adaptive efforts, as an important factor in determining the 
outcome of competition in evolutionary systems in which selection occurs across organizations 
that are themselves undergoing adaptation. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Evolutionary perspectives on firms and industries have become quite prominent in the 
strategy and organization’s literatures (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 
Baum and Singh, 1994; Burgelman, 1996). Central to the evolutionary argument is the presence 
of some process of competitive exclusion and differential selection. Furthermore, an important 
strand of the strategy and organization’s literature has taken a firm-centered view of evolutionary 
dynamics in analyzing the path-dependent processes of firm-level adaptation and learning (cf., 
Helfat, 2003). Although there has been some recognition of the need to consider the 
interrelationship between the processes of adaptation and selection (Levinthal, 1991a), and some 
important steps have been taken in that direction (March and Shapira, 1992; Barnett, Greve, and 
Park, 1994; Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Denrell and March, 2001; Greve, 2002), the micro 
dynamics of the two processes have only begun to be explored. Our objective in this paper was 
to use a simulation to explore the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level 
adaptation when individual organizations themselves are adapting. Our central finding from the 
simulations is that the efficacy with which selection discriminates among adaptive organizations, 
and as a consequence, the ability of selection to drive population-level adaptation, is a function 
of the process of organizational change itself. Search strategies that lead to learning outcomes 
that exhibit high reliability are more selectable in that selection is less prone to error when acting 
across firms that are pursuing highly reliable strategies.  
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We adopted the assumption of inertia with respect to organizations’ “genetic structure,” 
but this premise does not negate the possibility, or even the likelihood, of profound changes in 
the observed properties of an organization, what a biologist would refer to as its phenotype, and, 
as a consequence, the performance outcomes it experiences. In our analysis, the stable 
fundamental organizational property was the firm’s search strategy, both how alterative 
initiatives are evaluated (on-line vs. off-line) and the structural arrangements of the organization 
(integrated vs. functional). The search strategy in turn determines the broad characteristics of the 
dynamics of organizational adaptation.  
In examining selection, efficacy can be considered from two very different perspectives. 
First, from a simple cross-sectional perspective, to what degree are poorly performing firms 
selected out of the population at any given point in time? Second, from a longitudinal 
perspective, are those entities that are on a superior latent adaptive trajectory more likely to 
survive? The longitudinal problem exists because organizations are adapting and selection is 
inherently myopic. Even the self-consciously forward-looking selection efforts of investment 
analysts and venture capitalists are necessarily constructed on the basis of current and historical 
data. We held constant cross-sectional efficacy and focused our attention on the longitudinal 
problem which only exists when there is adaptation: Under what conditions can myopic selection 
demonstrate the possibility of prospective intelligence, identifying adapting organizations at 
intermediate points in time, in the midst of change, that will be superior in the long-run? 
Results of our model point to the fact that the efficacy of selection is endogenous to the 
dynamics of organizational adaptation. Important stable attributes of organization such as 
strategies or routines may differ not only in their contribution to organizational fitness or 
performance at a given point in time but may also have differential impact on the efficacy of 
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selection over time. We denoted this effect on the efficacy of selection as selectability, an 
organization-level construct that measures the information content embodied in current 
performance as a determinant of the efficacy of selection in identifying organizations that will be 
superior in the long run. For organizations that exhibit high levels of selectability, intermediate 
performance provides superior information about long-run performance, and consequently, 
selection is more effective longitudinally within populations of such organizations.  
An important driver of selectability is the extent to which adaptation proceeds more or 
less reliably over time. Our finding on reliability is closely related to the ideas developed in the 
population ecology literature, in particular, the early argument that selection occurs on the basis 
of reliability (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Although later work has relaxed this argument (cf. 
Hannan, 2005: 53), our results suggest that selection on performance alone is sufficient to 
generate a correlation between reliability and survival: the role of reliability emerges 
endogenously from a model in which inert strategies guide organizational learning in a 
competitive ecology. The correlation between reliability and survival occurs because for patterns 
of adaptation that are highly reliable overtime, an organization’s performance at any point in 
time provides better information for selection to act upon in filtering out inferior organizations 
(i.e., it is more selectable). For example, the integrated search strategy exhibits higher 
selectability than does the baseline blind strategy. As a consequence, selection across integrated-
strategy firms is more effective at removing poor quality organizations. Conditional on survival, 
firms using integrated search on average outperform those engaged in blind search, even though 
unconditional on survival they exhibit identical long-run performance. That said, though our 
model highlights the process by which selection favors reliability, it was only tested in a stable 
environment. Left unexplored in our paper are the implications of our model for the 
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consequences of reliability in performance under conditions of environmental turbulence 
(Dobrev, Kim, and Carroll, 2003). 
Taking the myopia of selection into account has important implications for our 
understanding of the interrelationship between the processes of adaptation and selection, in 
particular, for understanding the relative merits of exploration versus exploitation strategies. 
March’s (1991) well-known result is that exploratory strategies (with higher variance) tend to 
favor long-run performance, while exploitive strategies favor near-term performance. But 
strategies that are effective in the long run must survive a series of short-run selection demands 
(Levinthal and March, 1993). The myopia of selection suggests that prospects for the long-run 
performance advantage of exploration must be offset by the higher performance variance over 
time which tends to obscure estimates of an organization’s underlying quality. This difficulty of 
estimating performance in turn increases the risk that latently superior firms will fail and inferior 
firms will survive. It would even suggest that firms with poor endowments would choose to 
pursue an exploration strategy, not simply because it may enhance their long-run performance 
prospects but also because higher variance masks the performance deficit between them and their 
rivals. 
These results provide an alternative explanation for the observation that inferior 
organizations often come to dominate the set of surviving firms. Scholars have argued that this 
might occur because performance is not the sole determinant of the outcome of selection 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Our study suggests an additional explanation: that selection may 
be systematically prone to error. In contexts in which selection is acting across organizations 
engaged in adaptation, the reliability with which adaptation occurs is centrally important. 
Strategies that are inferior may dominate if they exhibit more reliability in their adaptive efforts.  
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In examining errors in the selection process, we uncovered an important relationship 
between the intensity of selection and its error rate. Researchers have long argued that higher 
munificence (a less intense selection regime) gives organizations access to external resources 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990), which in turn increase their decision latitude and enhance 
their performance (Baum and Wally, 2003). We identified an alternative mechanism by which 
munificence may enhance performance, in this case, population performance. In particular, 
selection that is less intense (more munificent) is subject to fewer errors in selectively removing 
inferior firms. If the distinctive properties of organizations, such as tacit and organizationally 
embedded knowledge, are lost with the dissolution of a firm, then less intense selection, with its 
lower error rate may enhance social welfare.  
An additional counterintuitive result is that using more information in the selection 
process – using historical data in addition to current data – does not necessarily improve the 
efficacy of selection. In fact, using more data improved the efficacy of selection only when 
search efforts suffered from a lack of short-wave reliability because of a blind search strategy. 
The efficacy of selection across strategies that exhibited relatively high short-wave reliability 
(e.g., integrated and parallel) was strongly diminished by the use of historical data. For search 
strategies that result in infrequent large shocks, and a consequent lack of long-wave reliability, 
that devalue older learning (e.g., sequential strategy), the use of historical data also diminishes 
the efficacy of selection. 
Many important empirical contexts have selection that is discrete in time, rather than 
continuous. Perhaps the dominant example is that of venture capital. Our results suggest that 
discrete selection at early points in time is significantly less effective than is continuous 
selection. This result does not rule out the viability of discrete selection regimes. When carrying 
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out selection is costly, a trade-off between frequency and efficacy is to be expected. For 
example, in the venture capital context, the frequency of selection is in part a function of the cost 
of engaging in a round of selection. At the same time, our results demonstrate that in the 
transition from continuous to discrete selection, error rates grow faster under a weak selection 
regime than a strong selection regime. Our model thus suggests that one would expect to observe 
significantly more intense selection in a discrete selection regime than in a continuous selection 
regime and thus a much higher failure rate. This result is independent of the arguments for high 
failure rates that are commonly put forward about technological or market uncertainty and 
opportunity costs for venture capitalists. 
Finally, our examination of the efficacy of selection also enhances our understanding of 
the eternal question, what is a good strategy? Our results suggest an interesting answer. All else 
held constant, in competitive contexts in which survival is conditional on the performance of 
other firms, higher-variance strategies (March, 1991) decouple mean performance from survival 
and in doing so, alter the probability of survival for individual firms. At the population level, 
however, the survival of firms with inferior mean performance reflects a long run selection error. 
This result is particularly important when increasing reliability is costly and thus reliability must 
be traded off against long run performance. For example, a modicum of exploration may enhance 
long-run performance, relative to the local search we modeled, but it does so at the cost of 
decreased reliability. In such cases, counterintuitively an individual firm’s attempt to enhance its 
performance may diminish the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level 
adaptation and lead to a set of surviving firms that exhibit inferior performance. The high 
variance strategy may be superior at the individual firm level but inferior at the population level. 
A logical implication of the claim that selection makes systematic errors in identifying 
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organizations that would go on to do well is that, from the perspective of individual 
organizations, pursuing a strategy that increases selectability need not be advantageous. For 
example, organizations with poor initial strategic positions that engender limited long-run 
prospects may be best served by pursuing an adaptation strategy that purposefully obfuscates 
their performance outlook, reducing their selectability. Such a strategy may enhance their own 
survival prospects, even though it reduces the efficacy with which selection is able to enhance 
population-level performance. In this sense, systematic errors in the selection process, which are 
socially deleterious, may well represent strategic opportunities for organizations.  
Organizations engage in learning processes to enhance their performance prospects. 
Implicit in this organizational objective is that such action enhances their survival prospects. Yet, 
learning is a long and drawn out process – end states of learning may take months or years to 
achieve. Under the influence of the myopia of selection, the dynamics of organizational 
adaptation are a critical determinant of both the likelihood of survival for any particular 
organization and, more broadly, the efficacy of selection as a mechanism of population-level 
adaptation.  
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Figure 1. Learning curves and intertemporal correlation in performance.
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Figure 2. Example of a set of firm choices across two landscapes (N1 and N2) 
and the interactions between them.*
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Figure 3. Evaluation mode versus organizational structure: A matrix of alternative strategies.
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Figure 4a. Average performance of search strategies across time. 
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Figure 4b. Cross-sectional variation (S.D. across organizations). 
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Figure 4c. Short-wave reliability: Correlation in performance across time.
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
(F
t-1
,F
t) 
in
 F
itn
es
s
Period
Baseline
Integrated
Parallel
Sequential
ll l   
 - 56 -   
Figure 5a. Fitness improvement under weak selection (normalized by baseline search).
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Figure 5b. Fitness improvement under strong selection (normalized by baseline search).
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Figure 6. Selection error rates across search strategies at period 100.
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Figure 7. Long-wave reliability: The information content 
in contemporaneous performance.
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Figure 8. Selection error rate with performance history.*
* Numbers above the columns represent an increase or decrease in the 
error rate from the continuous selection mode resulted graphed in figure 6.
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error rate from the continuous selection mode results graphed in figure 6.
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Figure 10. Demographics of competitives outcomes (versus baseline search strategy).
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Figure 11. Winner of competitive outcomes (versus baseline search strategy).
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Table 1       
Difference in Mean Fitness at Period 100 under a Strong Selection Regime* 
Strategy Baseline Integrated Parallel 
Integrated .0047•••• -- -- 
 (.0013) -- -- 
Parallel .0027• -.0020 -- 
 (.0015) (.0015) -- 
Sequential -.0035••• -.0081•••• -.0061•••• 
 (.0015) (.0015) (.0017) 
• p < .10; •• p < .05; ••• p < .01; •••• p < .001. 
* Standard errors are in parentheses. The difference in fitness is the average row fitness less 
the average column fitness, with a positive difference indicating greater row fitness. 
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 APPENDIX: Construction of the NK Simulation 
 
Task Environment 
Firms operate in a task environment consisting of two nearly decomposable sub problem 
spaces (landscapes). A location in landscape 1 is represented by the vector 1N  (length 1n ) of 
policy choice attributes, and similarly, a location in landscape 2 is represented by the vector 2N  
(length 2n ). Taken together, a location in the combined landscape can be described by the row 
vector N  (length 1 2n=n +n ) of firm policy choice attributes such that:  
1 2
1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2 1 2n n
N={N ,N }=(a ,a ,...,a ,a ,a ,...,a ) .                     (1) 
For notational convenience, we have omitted the subscript denoting the firm, i, from the 
discussion that follows. We assume that each policy choice is binary (1 or 0) and therefore there 
are n2 possible combinations of organizational choices.  
The topography of the landscape is a function of the number of interactions between 
policy choices, which influence the degree to which the payoff of a focal policy choice depends 
on the value of other policy choices. Interactions can occur both within a landscape and between 
landscapes (the upper-right and lower-left quadrants in figure 2). 
Consider a single policy choice j on landscape L , Lja . For notational convenience, we let 
L=1 or 2 where ¬L=2 if L=1  and ¬L=1 if L=2 . Let WjK  represent the vector of policy choices 
of length Wk  ( L Wj ja K∉ ) within landscape L that affects the payoff to policy 
L
ja . The 
Wk  
policies with which Lja  interact are specified as the 
Wk  adjacent elements such that: 
 
W
L L W
j+1 j+kW
j W
(a ,...,a )              if k >0 
K =  
0                                 if k =0.
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
                            (2) 
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In addition, let BjK  represent the vector of policy choices of length 
Bk  on the other landscape 
¬L  that affect the payoff to policy choice Lja . Specifically, we randomly fill the vector 
B
jK  such 
that on average there are Bk  policies with which Lja  interact. Thus, this notation implies 
symmetry in values above and below diagonal. Though we implemented and ran a model with 
symmetry, and the results are identical, the models employed in the paper are not symmetrical. 
 
B
¬L ¬L B
-1B -k
j B
(a ,...,a )                if k >0 
K =  
0                                 if k =0.
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
           (3)  
We defined the fitness contribution of an individual policy choice j on landscape L , Lja , 
as Ljπ , such that: 
L L L L W ¬L B L L W B
j j j - j - j j j j jπ =π (a |a ÎK ,a ÎK )=π (a |K ,K ) .          (4) 
The fitness contribution of each policy choice, Ljπ , can take 
W B1+k +k2 unique values which are 
assigned as independent and identically distributed draws from a uniform distribution u[0,1].  
When W Bk=k +k =0 , the payoff to a policy choice depends on that choice alone. As k 
increases, the payoff to a policy choice depends not only on that choice but also on the value of k 
other policies. In general, low levels of interactions result in a smooth landscape (at the extreme, 
when W Bk =k =0 , the landscape has only a single peak), and high levels of interactions result in 
very rugged landscape with many local peaks reflecting a highly complex task environment. 
Asymmetry in the levels of interactions within and between the two nearly decomposable 
problem spaces, where W Bk >>k , produces a landscape that can be described as nearly 
decomposable. In the extreme, when 0=Bk , the landscape is fully decomposable. 
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The fitness of a firm with the policy choice (location) vector LN  on landscape L is 
defined as the average of the fitness contribution of each its LN  policy choices such that: 
L Ln n
L L L L W ¬L B L L W B
j j - j - j j j j jL L
j=1 j=1
1 1Π = π (a |a ÎK ,a ÎK )= π (a |K ,K )
n n∑ ∑ .                          (5) 
A firm's fitness on the combined landscape N  is the average of its fitness on each 
individual landscape such that: 
( )1 21Π= Π +Π2 .                    (6) 
Search 
Adaptation is modeled as a local search process in which a firm selects an innovation 
from an alternative set consisting of all policy-choice sets that vary from the current set by a 
single policy attribute. Thus at any location on an individual sub problem landscape (L=1 or 2) , 
there are Ln alternatives from which to choose.  
Firms are allocated two search efforts per period and as such, each period is subdivided 
into two sub periods at=t  and bt=t . Search varies across organizational structures and methods 
of evaluation which can be divided into two main forms based on organizational structure: (a) 
functional; and (b) non-functional. The parallel search strategy which employs a functional 
organizational structure with off-line evaluation proceeds as follows. In the first sub period of a 
given period t such that at=t , the firm selects at random one of its 
1
tN  landscape 1 policy choices 
to evaluate for possible change. Consider the policy choice 1j,ta , and its inverse 
1
j,tâ  (recall that 
policy choices are binary such that a flip entails switching a 1 to a 0 and vice versa). Without 
moving to the new location in landscape 1, the firm bcompares its expected fitness after the flip 
to its fitness prior to the flip and moves to the new location (accepts the flip) only if the move 
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results in an improvement in fitness. The evaluation of fitness is local, such that the firm 
considers only landscape 1 performance in assessing the outcome of a search attempt. After 
concluding search in landscape 1 (L=1)  , the firm then conducts search in sub period bt=t  in 
landscape 2 (L=2) . More formally, if: 
   
L Ln n
L L L L W B L L L L W B
m,t m,t ¬(m,j),t j m,t m,t m,t m,t ¬(m,j),t j,t m,t m,tL L
m=1 m=1
1 1ˆπ (a ;a ,a |K ,K )> π (a ;a ,a |K ,K )
n n∑ ∑    
L L L
t ¬j,t j,t
L L L
t ¬j,t j,t
ˆN =(a ,a )     otherwise,
then   
N =(a ,a ).
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
                                (7) 
The second functional structure gives rise to the sequential search strategy which is 
identical to the parallel strategy with the exception of the allocation of effort across the two sub 
problem landscapes. Prior to period 30, sequential strategy firms employ both search efforts in 
landscape 1. Post period 30, they follow the parallel strategy outlined above allocating one effort 
to each sub problem landscape. 
Integrated search strategies come in two forms, baseline blind (on-line evaluation) and 
integrated (off-line evaluation). For these strategies, a policy choice is chosen from the global 
landscape 1 21 2 1 1 1 2 2 2t t t 1 2 1 2n nN ={N ,N }=(a ,a ,...,a ,a ,a ,...,a ) . Two search efforts are made, one each in sub 
periods  at=t  and bt=t . The performance consequences of the each search effort is evaluated 
analogously to equation 7, but taking into account the global (rather than sub problem) 
landscape. On-line evaluation is done by moving immediately to the new location regardless of 
the performance consequences. If the flip causes a performance decrease, then at the start of the 
next period, the firm returns to its earlier location. Off-line evaluation is conducted (as earlier) 
with a move to the new location only if the move improves performance. 
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Selection 
We examined the outcome of the developmental process under selection regimes that 
vary in timing, intensity, and duration. The probability of firm i surviving a selection event in 
period t is defined as: 
tZ
i,t
i,t
t
Π
s = .
Max(Π )
⎛ ⎞
⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
                           (8) 
where tMax(Π )  is the maximum fitness at time t by all firms in the population. tZ  defines the 
strength of selection. Because time is discrete, we treat tZ  as a vector of real numbers [0, ]∞  that 
define the strength of selection in each time period from t=0  to maxt=t  such that Maxt t tZ =(z ,...,z ) . 
A random number is drawn from a uniform distribution u[0,1]. If i,ts  is greater than or equal to 
the realization of the draw, then the firm survives. When tZ =0 , the probability of survival for 
firm i in period t is i,ts =1  (100%). As tZ  increases, the probability of survival conditional on the 
firm’s fitness declines.  
 
Simulation Model 
The simulation models 200 firms as they search under risk of selection for 100 periods 
max(t =100) . The simulation proceeds as follows. At time t=0, each firm is randomly allocated an 
initial location in both landscape 1, 1i,0N , and landscape 2, 
2
i,0N . Each period t is divided into two 
sub-periods (parts a and b) and firms are allocated two search efforts per period. At the end of 
each full period, after all firms have completed their search effort, firms are subject to selection. 
Results are averaged over 100 runs of the simulation. 
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1 Modeling entry entails a number of choices, such as whether the entry process is random or 
entrants tend to be replications of existing organizations, which would affect our assessment of 
the extent to which selection improves the population’s performance across search strategies. 
 
2 The selection model implemented here is based on proportional performance. Such a model is 
sensitive to the extent of cross-sectional variation. We also ran the models in this paper using a 
rank-order selection criterion and the results did not change markedly. 
 
